Washington National Guard Prepares Lessons
Learned;
Rapid Fielding Initiative Providing Needed Equipment
Story Reprinted from
National Guard & Defense Review Magazine (http://www.northupinfo.com/ngdr/story_details.asp?id=12);
Photos
Courtesy 81st Brigade Combat Team Public Affairs - Posted
Dec, 2004
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Major General Timothy Lowenberg knows what its like to deploy troops. The Washington Army National Guard has been mobilizing units for the War on Terror since the beginning and currently has almost sixty-one percent of its force structure overseas. In one of the higher profile deployments, members of the states 81st Armored Brigade became one of the first Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades (ESB) to deploy to a combat zone.
Formed in the early 1990s, these brigades were designed to provide the Army with fifteen National Guard brigade combat teams that could be deployed quickly once a major theater war began. Using data collected during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Army planners felt it was important to maintain at least some of the Guards force structure at a higher level of readiness. Ten years later, these units have finally been put to their first test.
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After the 81st deployed, MG Lowenberg and his staff developed a number of lessons learned that should be incorporated into future National Guard mobilizations.
During a recent interview he left no doubt that, though difficult to manage at the state level, the deployment of large Army National Guard formations like the 81st has gone well.
These units are on the front lines, conducting infantry missions in very contentious areas. The Army is making good on its commitment to equip and train these soldiers before they ever set foot in country. We have lived up to expectations, and in many cases, exceeded them.
The 81sts mobilization, however, was not without controversy. During the initial call-up, media reports circulated that the brigades deployment had to be delayed so that units could be retrained in the skills they would need once deployed. This left the impression in many peoples minds that the brigade was performing badly during its post-mobilization training. In fact, as MG Lowenberg pointed out during the interview, the delay was caused by conflicting guidance from the Army and a change of mission from commanders in Iraq.
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During testimony before the House of Representatives in April 2004, MG Lowenberg told the Committee on Government Reform that: An additional mobilization and deployment challenge was raised when US Central Command (CENTCOM), Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF7) requested that the 81st Brigade (a Heavy force equipped primarily with M1A1 Abrams Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and a variety of other tracked and wheeled vehicles) mobilize and deploy as a wheel-mounted rifle organization (company level units of action). This fundamental organizational reconfiguration presented new and unique training challenges and a complex Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for the new and fundamentally different type of combat organization requested. The lack of an approved, provisional MTOE and vetted mission guidance further complicated the mobilization process.
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By the time the dust settled, however, the 81st met its deployment timeline and arrived in Iraq according to plan. According to MG Lowenberg, our experience with the 81st showed us several things that we will use later. What are some of those lessons?
First, as Army National Guard Brigades are alerted for possible deployment, it is imperative that unit commanders are brought onto active duty well ahead of their soldiers. This provides for a smoother transition and allows units to hit the ground running.
Second, as National Guard brigades have been mobilized, they have been inundated with new equipment provided by the Armys Rapid Fielding Initiative.
Soldiers and leaders have to become familiar with everything from sophisticated communications equipment and vehicles to new individual body armor and small arms. MG Lowenberg points out that every soldier has to be retrained and qualified on the equipment he or she will use in combat. This retraining adds to the time it takes to get the National Guard units ready for deployment. Providing units with the equipment prior to mobilization would reduce the time it takes to move a Guard unit overseas. Prior to 2001, this has been one of the more contentious issues between the Army and Army National Guard.
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As an adjunct to the difficulties of new equipment training, all Army units that deploy to a combat zone must undergo a Mission Rehearsal Exercise at one of the combat training centers in California or Louisiana prior to leaving the United States. These exercises are designed to simulate conditions found in Iraq and Afghanistan and have been universally praised for their effectiveness. A problem arises, however, when the brigades use their own vehicles during their rotations at NTC or JRTC. The net increase in wear and tear requires extensive repairs and time loss prior to the units deploying. MG Lowenberg believes that the Army should keep a standard set of equipment at the Combat Training Centers so that active and Guard brigades can fall-in on the same types of vehicles as their own, thus saving time and money.
In addition to these command and control and equipment issues, the Washington National Guard also identified several soldier readiness problems that unit commanders should be aware of prior to being alerted. Of particular concern were dental issues. Several soldiers had to receive significant dental treatment prior to the deployment, without which they would have been considered non-deployable.
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MG Lowenberg pointed out that statistics show that nearly 40% of the Guard & Reserve has no dental plan. Though expensive, it would save many man-hours if a system could be developed where reservists could receive periodic dental treatment during normal training periods.
The lessons learned by the Washington National Guard were briefed to members of Congress and military leaders in Washington earlier this year and some of MG Lowenbergs recommendations are in the process of being implemented. As more National Guard units are mobilized and deployed, they will face many of the same problems as the 81st, but there are clear indications that the Army and Army National Guard are beginning to work together to make sure the Guard remains accessible as an operational reserve for the active component.
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